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Hitotsubashi University  1
1. Introduction 
Following the collapse of the bubble economy in the early 1990s, Japan’s 
economic growth stalled: real GDP growth in the period 1995-2004 did not exceed 
1.0%, which is considerably slower than the 3.3% growth registered in 1973-1995 
(based on data from the EU KLEMS Database, March 2007) and the lowest among the 
six major developed economies (the US, Japan, Germany, France, the UK and Italy).   
A frequently heard argument in Europe and the US is that the core countries of 
the EU, such as Germany and France, have been falling behind the US in terms of 
increasing productivity. Inklaar et al. (2006), for example, found that although the level 
of labor productivity in Germany, France and the Netherlands was almost same as that 
in the US, total factor productivity (TFP) growth in these countries since the mid-1990s 
has been much slower than in the US, especially in market services. Similarly, van Ark 
et al. (2006) report that TFP growth in industries using information and 
telecommunication technology (ICT-using industries) in the core EU countries since 
1995 has been much slower than in the US. Meanwhile, Stiroh (2002) and Triplett and 
Bosworth (2002) report that TFP growth in ICT-using industries in the US, such as 
communication, finance and commerce, has accelerated substantially since 1995 and 
this acceleration represents the main engine of productivity growth in the US economy.   
The slowdown of Japan’s economic growth and the above mentioned studies 
comparing TFP growth in the EU and the US raise the question whether Japan has a 
similar problem as the major EU economies with regard to the introduction of ICT to 
market services. Yet, despite the importance of this issue, there have been few studies 
which compare TFP growth and the impact of the ICT revolution in the major EU 
economies, Japan and the US at the industry level – probably because of the lack of 
appropriate data for a broad and rigorous international comparison.   
In order to analyze this issue, researchers of the Japan Industrial Productivity 
Database Project, including the authors, have joined the EU KLEMS consortium and 
supplied original data on Japan for the EU KLEMS database. The first public-release 
version of the EU KLEMS database is available online at the EU KLEMS website, 
<http://www.euklems.net/>. In this paper, using this database, we compare productivity 
growth and the accumulation of ICT capital by industry in Japan, the major EU 
economies, and the US. We also use the results of the labor productivity comparison 
project at the Japan Center of Economic Research. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present an 
overview of the pattern of economic growth and productivity improvement in Japan, the 
major EU economies, and the US. We also compare the absolute labor productivity  2
levels of these countries by industry. In Section 3 we analyze the role of ICT investment 
on economic growth. We compare the movement in ICT investment in Japan with that 
in Korea based on the data in (Pyo et al. (2007). In addition, we compare the impact of 
ICT capital services on economic growth in Japan with those in the US and major EU 
countries. In Section 4, we analyze the reallocation of resources in Japan. We examine 
this issue using a growth accounting framework based on Jorgenson et al. (2007). 
Finally, Section 5 summarizes our main results. 
 
2. Overview of Economic Growth and Productivity Improvement in the Major EU 
Economies, Japan and the US 
We first compare the results of growth accounting for Japan, the major EU 
economies (Germany, France, the UK and Italy), and the US. Figure 1 shows the growth 
accounting results for the market sector of these countries for the periods 1980-95 and 
1995-2004. The figure shows that Japan experienced a severe downturn during the latter 
period and, of the countries considered here, registered the highest annual rate of growth 
(3.6%) in 1980-95, but the lowest rate (0.7%) in 1995-2004. Germany experienced a 
mild slowdown in economic growth (from 1.9% to 1.1%).
1 The other four countries 
registered an acceleration in economic growth after 1995. The average growth rate for 
the four countries rose from 2.3% in 1980-95 to 2.6% in 1995-2004.   
 
INSERT Figure 1 
 
There is a stark difference in the causes underlying the growth acceleration in 
France, the UK and Italy on the one hand and the US on the other. In the three EU 
countries, the acceleration in economic growth was mainly achieved through labor input 
growth. As Figure 2 shows, the increase in labor input growth in France and Italy did 
not take the form of improvements in labor quality but of increases in total hours 
worked. In contrast, in the case of the UK, the quality of labor input improved 
substantially. Until 1995, these three countries suffered high unemployment rates, 
especially among the less-educated young, but succeeded in creating jobs for these 
unemployed. The average of the standardized unemployment rate of the three countries 
declined from 11.3% in 1995 to 7.4% in 2004. On the other hand, the standardized 
unemployment rate in Japan increased from 3.1% to 4.7% during the same period 
(OECD 2006). In contrast with the three EU countries just mentioned, the main cause of 
the growth acceleration in the US was an increase in TFP growth (from 0.7% in 
                                                  
1  The EU KLEMS data on Germany for years before Germany’s unification include East Germany.  3
1980-95 to 1.6% in 1995-2004). 
 
INSERT Figure 2 
 
Turning to TFP growth in Japan and the four major EU economies, a similar 
slowdown can be observed. Comparing the two periods, Japan’s average TFP growth 
rate dropped by 0.8 percent points, from 1.2% in 1980-95 to 0.4% in 1995-2004. In the 
four major EU economies, the TFP growth rate also declined by 0.8 percent points, from 
1.0% in 1980-95 to 0.2% in 1995-2004. Thus, among the six major developed 
economies, the US is exceptional in the acceleration in TFP growth it experienced. 
Looking at the factors contributing to the slowdown in growth in the market 
sector of Japan’s economy, the most important is the decline in the contribution of 
capital input growth. Of the 2.9 percentage-point decline in the growth rate of Japan’s 
market sector from the earlier to the latter period, 42% was accounted for by the 
deceleration in capital accumulation. In contrast, in all of the other five countries, the 
contribution of capital input growth increased (Figure 3). In particular the US and the 
UK experienced an acceleration in capital accumulation. As Figure 3 shows, this capital 
deepening in the two countries was caused by the rapid accumulation of ICT capital. 
 
INSERT Figure 3 
 
To sum up the above analysis, it is not the gap in TFP growth but differences in 
factor input growth that caused the large difference in the economic growth 
performance of France, the UK and Italy on the one hand and Japan on the other in the 
period after 1995. The four major EU economies (Germany, France, the UK and Italy) 
and Japan experienced a slowdown in TFP growth of a similar magnitude after 1995. 
Only the US accomplished an exceptional acceleration in TFP growth.   
Figure 4 compares industry level TFP growth in the six countries before and after 
1995. TFP growth in the electrical machinery, post and communication sector was still 
highest in Japan among the six economies after 1995. However, the problem for Japan 
is that, like in other countries, the share of this sector in the economy overall is not very 
large. The average share of labor input (hours worked) in this sector in Japan’s total 
labor input in 1995-2004 was 4.1%. In the US, this share was 3.3%. The largest declines 
in TFP growth in Japan occurred in distribution services (retail, wholesale and 
transportation) and in the rest of the manufacturing sector (i.e., excluding electrical 
machinery). The labor input shares of these two sectors were 23.4% and 16.8%  4
respectively. The US and the major EU economies except Italy recorded high TFP 
growth in these two sectors. Compared with Germany, France and the UK, Japan’s TFP 
growth in 1995-2004 was low in other goods-producing industries (construction, mining, 
agriculture, fishery and forestry), but relatively high in finance and business services. 
Except in France, TFP growth in personal and social services stalled in all the countries 
examined here.   
 
INSERT Figure 4 
 
If a country’s productivity is at the world top level, then in order to accomplish 
further productivity improvement, the country needs to innovate (Acemoglu et al. 2006) 
and to adjust its economic structures to novel technologies. On the other hand, if a 
country’s productivity level lags behind the world frontier, then the adoption of already 
existing technologies and improvements in its resource allocation are probably more 
important. Inklaar et al. (2006) found that labor productivity levels in market services in 
continental Europe were on par with the US in 1997, but since then productivity growth 
in Europe has been much weaker, suggesting that the continental European countries 
need to do more to innovate and adjust economic structures to novel technologies. This 
observation raises the question: Is Japan in a similar situation as the continental 
European countries?   
Unfortunately, the EU KLEMS Database (March 2007 version) does not include 
data that allow a comparison of productivity levels across countries. In this paper, we 
therefore use the results of a comparison of labor productivity conducted by the Japan 
Economic Foundation (JEF) and the Japan Center for Economic Research (JCER) 
(JEF-JCER 2007).
2  The study compares 27 industries covering the whole economy for 
the period 1980-2003 (1980-2002 in the case of Japan). The JEF-JCER comparison of 
labor productivity for Japan, Germany, France, the UK and the US is mainly based on 
purchasing power parity (PPP) data for 1997 from the EU KLEMS Project, real value 
added and man-hour input data from the EU KLEMS 60-Industry Database, the 
Input-Output Tables of the OECD STAN Database, and the Asian International 
Input-Output Table 2000 of the Institute of Developing Economies.
3 Differences of 
                                                  
2  We would like to thank Ms. Reiko Suzuki of the JCER for helping us to gain access to the 
JEF-JCER data and providing us with various valuable comments. 
3  The JEF-JCER study also compared the labor productivity of China and the US and of Korea and 
the US by industry. In addition to the above-mentioned data sources, the intra-Asian comparisons are 
based on the PPP data of the International Comparison of Productivity Among Asian Countries 
(ICPA) Project conducted by the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).  5
labor input quality across countries and over time are not taken account of in the 
JEF-JCER labor productivity comparison. Basically, the study compares the real value 
added per man-hour after adjustments for absolute price differences.   
 
INSERT Figures 5, 6, 7 and 8 
 
Figures 5, 6, 7 and 8 show the results of the JEF-JCER study for 2002. In the case 
of the comparisons between the US and European countries, the results are similar to 
those of Inklaar et al. (2006). Productivity levels in Germany and France were very 
close to those in the US both in market services and manufacturing, while productivity 
levels in the UK were lower than in the two continental European countries. In 
manufacturing sectors, productivity levels in Japan were on par with those in the US, 
Germany and France (Figure 5). However, they were very low in comparison with the 
three countries both in market services and other goods-producing industries. It 
therefore seems that there is large room for improvement in Japan’s productivity in 
market services and other goods-producing services through the adoption of already 
existing technologies and better resource allocation. 
 
3. ICT Investment in Japan and Korea 
From the JIP and KIP databases, we are able to extract data on ICT assets and 
compare the trends in ICT investment in the two countries. Our definition of ICT assets 
is consistent with that stipulated by the OECD and is comprised of computer and 
peripheral equipment, communication equipment and software. 
Developments in ICT investment in Japan are shown in Figure 9. ICT 
investment in Japan grew steadily until 1991 and for the period 1970-2004 overall, its 
average growth rate was 12.1% per annum. However, since the 1990s, ICT investment 
has followed a cyclical pattern. Stagnating in the first half of the 1990s, ICT investment 
increased again during the second half, before declining again during the early 2000s. In 
2004, ICT investment stood at 22.6 trillion yen, accounting for 19% of total investment 
and making up the largest component of investment. The biggest component within ICT 
investment was investment in computer and peripheral equipment, which in 2004 
amounted to 11 trillion yen or 50% of total ICT investment. 
 
INSERT Figure 9   
 
Figure 10 shows the trends in ICT investment in Korea as measured by Pyo, et al.  6
(2007). ICT investment in Korea increased steadily until the Asian currency crisis in 
1997. After a dramatic decline, ICT investment recovered rapidly and amounted to 26 
trillion won. In the 2000s, the amount of ICT investment has consistently exceeded 20 
trillion won. Its growth rate from 1970 to 2005 was 15.5% on average, which was 
higher than the growth rate in Japanese ICT investment. However, if we calculate the 
growth rate in ICT investment in both countries since 1995, when the ICT revolution 
started, ICT investment in Korea shows the same growth rate (5.9%) as in Japan. 
 
INSERT Figure 10   
 
However, the composition of ICT investment in Korea differs from that in Japan. 
In Korea, software investment accounted for over 50% of total ICT investment in 2005 
and was the largest component. Computer investment, which was the largest component 
in Japan, on the other hand accounted for only 17% of total ICT investment. In Japan, 
both computer investment and software investment have increased at a annual rate of 
6% since 1995. In contrast, in Korea, although software investment has increased at a 
pace of 9% since 1995, the growth in computer investment was negative (-1.2%). 
In Figure 11, we show ICT investment as a share of GDP in both countries. 
Although the ratio in both countries basically shows the same positive trend, it shows 
different cyclical patterns. For example, during recessions in Japan (in the wake of the 
oil shocks in the 1970s and the collapse of the bubble economy in the 1990s), the ratio 
in Korea was higher than that in Japan. However, following the recovery from the 
long-term stagnation in Japan, the ratio in Japan became higher than in Korea. 
 
INSERT Figure 11 
 
Next, we investigate the trends in ICT capital stock in both countries. Figure 12 
shows the development of Japanese ICT capital. ICT capital in Japan increased at an 
average rate of 11.0% per annum from 1970 to 2004 to reach 79 trillion yen, accounting 
for 5.3% of total capital stock. Among the three ICT capital components, the stock of 
computer equipment accounted for the largest share, 40%, of the total ICT capital stock. 
 
INSERT Figure 12 
 
Because Pyo, et al. (2007) provided data on capital stock by type of asset for 
1977, we can estimate the ICT capital stock in Korea using the perpetual inventory  7
method. But while Pyo, et al. (2007) also showed the depreciation rate by type of asset, 
we decided to use our own depreciation rate calculated from the JIP database in order to 
have a more consistent basis for the comparison of ICT capital stocks in Japan and 
Korea. The different depreciation rates for ICT asset in Japan and Korea are shown in 
Table 1. As can be seen, the depreciation rate for ICT assets is higher in Japan than in 
Korea.  
 
INSERT Table 1 
 
Figure 13 shows the estimated ICT capital stock in Korea. It grew at average rate 
of 13.2% per annum from 1977 to 2005 and reached 91 trillion won in 2005. While the 
capital stock in information equipment and software followed an upward trend, the 
capital stock in computer equipment decreased after 2001. (As a result, the share of 
capital stock in computer equipment in the total ICT capital is only 14.7% in 2005, 
while that in Japan is 40%.   
 
INSERT Figure 13 
 
As for the accumulation of ICT capital, Japan and Korea showed similar growth 
patterns. We were not able to find clearly different trends in the ICT investment/GDP 
ratios of the two countries. However, the composition of ICT assets in Japan is different 
from that in Korea. In Japan, ICT investment has been dominated by investment in 
computer equipment. On the other hand, On the other hand, software investment has 
dominated the total ICT investment in recent years. 
Finally, we examine the impact of the accumulation of ICT capital on economic 
growth. The impact can be measured by using the growth rate in ICT capital services. 
Table 2 shows the contribution of ICT capital services to economic growth by industry.
4 
In the US and the UK, the contribution of ICT capital increased in almost all sectors 
after 1995. In France, the contribution of ICT capital service input growth increased in 
all sectors except personal and social services. In Germany, the contribution of ICT 
capital service input growth increased in all sectors except two (distribution services and 
personal and social services). In contrast, in Japan and Italy, there are many sectors 
where the contribution of ICT service input growth decreased after 1995. In Japan, the 
contribution of ICT capital service input growth declined in all sectors after 1995, while 
                                                  
4  Because we do not know the user cost of capital in Korea, we compare the contribution in ICT 
capital service in Japan with those in US and major EU countries.  8
in Italy, it fell in all sectors except two (finance and business services and personal and 
social services). 
 
INSERT Table 2 
 
 
4. Reallocation of Resources and TFP Growth 
We commonly observe that factor prices for the same category of labor or rates of 
return to capital are different across industries. If such differences are caused by 
institutional obstacles to inter-industry factor movements and each factor price is equal 
to the marginal product of that production factor, GDP can be raised by shifting 
production factors from industries with low factor prices to those with high factor prices. 
In this section, we analyze how such resource reallocations have contributed to Japan’s 
economic growth.   
Let us analyze this issue in a growth accounting framework. As Jorgenson et al. 
(2007) have shown, how the resource reallocation effect is measured in growth 
accounting depends on the type of growth accounting method chosen. In the case of 
growth accounting in the EU KLEMS project, factor price equalization between 
industries is not assumed and macro-level factor inputs are calculated by a Tornqvist 
index, in which factor input growth across industries is aggregated by using factor 
income in each industry as aggregation weight. Therefore, if production factors move 
from low factor price industries to high factor price industries, this reallocation will be 
treated as an increase in macro-level factor inputs. Jorgenson et al. labeled this type of 
growth accounting method the “direct aggregation across industries” approach.   
However, there is another type of growth accounting method, which Jorgenson et 
al. called the “production possibility frontier” approach. In this case, each input is 
assumed to receive the same price in all industries. The macro-level quantity of each 
input is the simple sum of inputs across industries. In this approach, reallocation effects 
are included in macro TFP growth.   
Jorgenson et al. showed the following relationship between the macro TFP 
growth derived from the production possibility frontier approach, νT, and the macro TFP 
growth derived from the direct aggregation across industries approach, νT



























































































The upper bars denote the average of values in period t and in period t+1, Δ represents 
the change of a value from period t to period t+1, wj is the proportion of industry j’s 
value added in aggregate value added, νK, j and νL, j   are the share of capital and of labor 
income in industry j’s gross output, and νV, j stands for industry j’s value added-gross 
output ratio. Therefore the coefficient of νj, wj/νK, j, in equation (2) denotes the ratio of 
industry j’s gross output to aggregated value added. Equation (2) implies that the macro 
TFP growth derived from the direct-aggregation-across-industries approach, νT
D, is 
equal to the direct aggregation of each industry’s TFP growth with Domar weights.   
In equation (1), Kj denotes the Tornqvist index of capital input in industry j and Lj 
the Tornqvist index of labor input in industry j:  
∑ Δ = Δ
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Kk,j denotes input of type k capital in industry j and Ll,j input of type l labor in industry j. 
Similarly, PK,k,j denotes the price for type k capital in industry j and PL,l,j the price for 
type l labor in industry j.
5 
                                                  
5  It is difficult to measure the actual income of each type of capital in each industry. Similarly we  10
K and L denote the macro-level capital input index and the macro-level labor 
input index, which are calculated under the assumption of identical factor prices across 
industries:  
∑ Δ = Δ
k
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PK,k stands for the economy-wide average price for type k capital and PL,l the 
economy-wide average price for type l labor. 
In equation (1), νK represents the aggregated capital income-value added ratio and 
νL the aggregated labor income-value added ratio.   
The second term on the right-hand side of equation (1) denotes the effect of 
capital reallocation on macro TFP growth, νT, which is derived from the production 
possibility frontier approach. Similarly, the third term on the right-hand side of equation 
(1) denotes the effect of labor reallocation on the macro TFP growth, νT, which is 
derived from the production possibility frontier approach. We can rewrite the second 
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are not sure whether the data on the wage rate for each category of workers in each industry are 
reliable or not.    11
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In equation (3), the value of wjνK, j/νV, j is equal to the ratio of capital income in 
industry  j to the macro-level value added. The value of this coefficient shows the 
percentage increase in GDP for a one-percent increase in capital input in industry j. On 
the other hand, the value of wK,jνK shows the percentage increase in GDP for a 
one-percent increase in capital input in industry j when the average price of capital 
across different types of capital in industry j is equal to the economy-wide average price 
of capital, that is, ΣkPK,k,jKk,j=ΣkPK,kKk,j.  
Therefore, the first term on the right-hand side of equation (3) denotes the 
inter-industry reallocation effect of aggregated capital. If the industry-level growth rate 
of capital input, Δln Kj, is positive in industries where the industry-level average capital 
price is higher than the macro-level average capital price, i.e., ΣkPK,k,jKk,j>ΣkPK,kKk,j, and 
if the industry-level growth rate of capital input, Δln Kj, is negative in industries where 
the industry-level average capital price is lower than the macro-level average capital 
price, i.e., ΣkPK,k,jKk,j<ΣkPK,kKk,j, then there will be a positive inter-industry reallocation 
effect of aggregated capital.   
In the case of the continuous time version of equation (3), the second term on the 
right-hand side of equation (3) can be expressed as   
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Therefore, we can interpret the second term on the right-hand side of equation (3) as the 
reallocation effect of changes in the capital composition within each industry. Suppose 
that the relative price of type k capital to the average value of prices for other types of 
capital in industry j is lower than the macro-level average relative price of type k capital, 
then an increase of capital input of this type in industry j will improve resource 
allocation and raise the macro TFP growth rate derived from the production possibility 
frontier approach, νT. 
A similar interpretation applies to the labor reallocation effect. The third term on 
the right-hand side of equation (1) can be decomposed into the inter-industry 
reallocation effect of aggregated labor and the reallocation effect of changes in the labor 
composition within each industry.  12
However, as we have already pointed out, it is difficult to measure actual income 
for each type of capital in each industry. Similarly, we are not sure whether our data on 
the wage rate for each category of workers in each industry is reliable or not. Because of 
these difficulties, we mainly focus on the inter-industry reallocation effect of aggregated 
capital and aggregated labor in this paper. 
Table 3 shows the TFP growth of Japan’s market economy derived from the 
production possibility frontier approach, νT, the TFP growth of Japan’s market economy 
derived from the direct aggregation across industries approach, νT
D, the reallocation 
effect of capital input and the reallocation effect of labor input for the periods 
1975-1980, 1980-1990, 1990-2000 and 2000-2002. We used JIP Database 2006 for this 
analysis. 
 
INSERT Table 3 
 
We find that for all periods expect 1975-80, the reallocation effect of capital input 
was negligible. On the other hand, there was a positive and substantial reallocation 
effect of labor input after 1980. What is more, after 1990, the reallocation effect of labor 
input became greater than the Domar weighted TFP growth (macro TFP growth derived 
from the direct aggregation across industries approach), νT
D. 
 
INSERT Figures 14 and 15 
 
Figure 14 shows the industry level reallocation effect of aggregated capital input, 
(wjνK,j/νV,j - wK,jνK)Δln Kj, and the two components of this value, wjνK,j/νV,j - wK,jνK and 
Δln Kj for the periods 1975-1990 and 1990-2002. In almost all industries, capital inputs 
increased in both periods. Therefore, industries with high capital prices, such as 
construction, civil engineering, wholesale, finance, and other services for businesses, 
contributed to the improvement of capital allocation. And industries with low capital 
prices, such as electricity, railway, road transportation, telegraph and telephone, and 
rental of office equipments and goods, was responsible for negative reallocation effects.   
Figure 15 shows the industry level reallocation effect of aggregated labor input, 
(wjνL,j/νV,j – wL,jνL)Δln Lj, and the two components of this value, wjνL,j/νV,j – wL,jνL and 
Δln Lj for the periods 1975-1990 and 1990-2002. In most service industries with low 
labor prices, such as construction, retail, and eating and drinking places, labor input 
increased and these increases were responsible for negative reallocation effects. On the 
other hand, in agriculture, in which labor prices are low, the decline of labor input  13
created a large positive reallocation effect. In some service industries with high labor 
prices, such as wholesale, finance, insurance, and information services, the increase of 
labor input caused positive reallocation effects. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Using the recently released EU KLEMS Database (March 2007) and other 
statistics, we examined whether Japan experienced similar problems as the major EU 
economies with regard to the slowdown of TFP growth. We also compared the 
movement in ICT investment in Japan with that in Korea based on the data in Pyo, Jung 
and Cho (2007). In addition, we compared the impact of ICT capital services on 
economic growth in Japan and the US and major EU countries. Using the JIP Database 
2006, we also examined the reallocation of resources in Japan. We studied this issue in a 
growth accounting framework based on Jorgenson et al. (2007). 
The major results obtained through our analysis are as follows: 
 
1.  It is not the gap in TFP growth but differences in factor input growth that 
underlie the large difference in the economic growth performance of France, the UK 
and Italy on the one hand and Japan on the other in the period after 1995. The four 
major EU economies (Germany, France, the UK and Italy) and Japan experienced a 
slowdown in TFP growth of a similar magnitude after 1995. The US was exceptional in 
accomplishing acceleration in TFP growth. 
2.  TFP growth in the electrical machinery, post and communication sector was 
still highest in Japan among the six economies after 1995. However, the problem for 
Japan is that, like in other countries, the share of this sector in the economy overall is 
not very large. The largest declines in TFP growth in Japan occurred in distribution 
services (retail, wholesale and transportation) and in the rest of the manufacturing sector 
(excluding electrical machinery). The labor input shares of these two sectors were very 
large (23.4% and 16.8% respectively). The US and the major EU economies except 
Italy recorded high TFP growth in these two sectors. 
3.  In manufacturing sectors, productivity levels in Japan were on par with those in 
the US, Germany and France. However, they were very low in comparison with the 
three countries both in market services and other goods-producing industries.   
4.  As for ICT capital accumulation, Japan and Korea showed similar patterns. We 
were not able to find clear differences in the trends of the ICT investment/GDP ratios of 
the two countries. However, the composition of ICT assets in Japan is different from 
that in Korea. (In Japan, investment in computer equipment accounted for the largest  14
share of ICT investment. On the other hand, software investment has dominated the 
total ICT investment in recent years.   
5.  In the US and the UK, the contribution of ICT capital increased in almost all 
sectors after 1995. In France, the contribution of ICT capital service input growth 
increased in all sectors except personal and social services. In Germany, the contribution 
of ICT capital service input growth increased in all sectors except two (distribution 
services and personal and social services). In contrast, in Japan and Italy, there are many 
sectors where the contribution of ICT service input growth decreased after 1995. In 
Japan, the contribution of ICT capital service input growth declined in all sectors after 
1995, while in Italy, it fell in all sectors except two (finance and business services and 
personal and social services). 
6.  The reallocation effect of capital input was negligible for all periods except 
1975-80. On the other hand, the reallocation effect of labor input became substantial 
after 1980. Moreover, after 1990, the reallocation effect of labor input became greater 
than the macro TFP growth rate derived from the direct aggregation across industries 
approach. 
7.  In most service industries with low labor prices, such as construction, retail, 
and eating and drinking places, labor input increased and these increases were 
responsible for negative reallocation effects. On the other hand, in agriculture, in which 
labor prices are low, the decline of labor input created a large positive reallocation effect. 
In some service industries with high labor prices, such as wholesale, finance, insurance, 
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17Source: EU KLEMS Database, March 2007.

































































































































































































18Source: EU KLEMS Database, March 2007.
































































































































































































19Other goods producing industries
Source: EU KLEMS Database, March 2007.
Figure 4. TFP Growth in the Market Sector: by Sector and by Country


















































































































































































































































Figure 5. Labor Productivity: Japan-US Comparison
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Figure 6. Labor Productivity: Germany-US Comparison
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Figure 7. Labor Productivity: France-US Comparison
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Figure 8. Labor Productivity: UK-US Comparison
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Japan 0.31 0.14 0.32
Korea 0.092 0.092 N.A.
Source: Japan - JIP Database 2006, Korea - Pyo, Jung and Cho (2007).
30Table 2. Contribution of ICT Capital Service Input Growth to Economic Growth
(%)
1995-2004
Japan US France Germany Italy UK Japan US France Germany Italy UK
Market economy total 0.44 0.52 0.32 0.86 0.23 0.51 0.35 0.81 0.49 0.99 0.25 0.99
.Electrical machinery, post
and communication
1.20 0.95 0.41 2.28 0.76 1.32 0.96 1.55 0.85 2.73 0.24 2.73
.Manufacturing, excluding
electrical
0.21 0.30 0.21 0.41 0.10 0.32 0.08 0.41 0.32 0.51 0.08 0.51
.Other goods producing
industries
0.16 0.17 0.05 0.20 0.09 0.14 0.06 0.21 0.21 0.10 0.04 0.10
.Distribution services 0.20 0.61 0.16 0.52 0.28 0.42 0.11 0.96 0.27 0.82 0.19 0.82
.Finance and business
services
1.55 0.98 0.72 2.22 0.45 1.04 1.19 1.24 1.04 1.82 0.66 1.82
.Personal and social
services
0.32 0.20 0.47 0.62 0.02 0.43 0.19 0.37 0.02 0.48 0.26 0.48
Source: EU KLEMS Database March 2007.
1980-95
31Table 3. Aggregate Reallocation Effects (Average Annual Rates)
1975-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000 2000-2002
Growth rate of aggregated TFP 2.23% 1.77% 0.34% 0.52%
Domar weighted TFP growth 2.10% 1.65% 0.11% 0.03%
Reallocation effects of capital input 0.14% -0.05% -0.03% 0.05%
Reallocation effect of labor input 0.00% 0.17% 0.26% 0.45%
32Figure 14. Industry-Level Reallocation Effect of Capital Input
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33Figure 15. Industry-Level Reallocation Effect of Labor Input
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